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A Search for Continuity in American Thought:
From Benjamin Franklin to William James
to Postmodernism
Samuel Jaeckel

Any search for continuity in American thought presupposes
causality in intellectual history. That is, ideas are not generated in a
vacuum; rather, ideas develop from other ideas to form a
continuous pattern of cause and effect. As a result, one dimension
of intellectual history is concerned with how these developing
ideas fit together. John Higham writes: "Let us say, then, that
intellectual history is first of all a branch of history, one variety of a
species, sharing the general characteristics that distinguish
historical knowledge. As such, it has an overriding concern with
how and why particular human experiences have followed one
another through time." 1
The first overriding concern of this essay is to isolate and
examine the thread of continuity stretching between the particular
human experiences of Benjamin Franklin and William James.
Despite being separated by over 100 years, Franklin, in his
Autobiography, and James, in Pragmatism, share certain
philosophical commonalities that suggest the cause and effect
pattern that characterizes intellectual history. By showing how
Franklin's philosophy can be analyzed through the prism of James'
pragmatism, we can see that a thread of continuity links various
tenets of the two philosophies. Namely, both Franklin and James'
philosophies ( 1 ) mediate between science and religion (or
empiricism and rationalism); (2) must be defined, of course, as
pragmatic; (3) demonstrate a distrust of abstraction and
metaphysical dogmatism, (4) can be characterized by their
changing nature; and (5) are distinguished by their future-oriented
approach.
The second concern, then, is to trace the trajectory of that thread
of continuity as it stretches beyond James straight into the
operative philosophy of today: postmodernism. A thread of
continuity links postmodernism and James on three specific fronts:
First, James exemplifies an extreme pessimism in purely objective
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truth. Second, James emphasizes the role human perspective plays
in asserting truth claims, thus anticipating postmodern
perspectivalism. Third, as a consequence of points one and two,
James reposes hope in the facility of genuine conversation between
different interpretive communities, a hope shared by many
postmodernists today. By tracing this thread of continuity between
James and postmodernism, and by methods of association, we are
confronted with the extraordinary question: Is Benjamin Franklin,
in some miraculous sense, postmodern? Although clearly
outlandish, this question is more tenable if phrased more modestly:
Do some of the tenets of postmodernism exist in embryonic form in
Franklin's philosophy? Phrased this way, this question might
enable us to trace a thread of continuity in American thought that
spans nearly two centuries.
According to Bruce Kuklich, a major theme "running through
James's writing is the attempt to link the facts of nature and spirit,
of science and religion." 2 "Indeed," Kuklich goes on to write, "it is
the crucial element in pragmatic philosophy." Throughout
Pragmatism, James attempts to negotiate between science, or
empiricism, on the one hand, and religion, or rationalism, on the
other. In fact, the tension produced from this dialectic fuels much of
the motivation of James' text and serves to mold pragmatism into a
systematic philosophy. The empiricist, according to James, is the
"lover of facts in all their crude variety .... " 3 The rationalist, on the·
other hand, is the "devotee to abstract and eternal principles."
Charting the middle way between empiricism and rationalism,
James proposes his philosophy of pragmatism: "It is at this point
that my own solution begins to appear. I offer the oddly-named
thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of
demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the
same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy
with facts." 4
The fact that Franklin attempts to do something very similar
to this- to meld rationalism with empiricism, religion with
science- is evidenced in Franklin's reflections on his invention of
the wood stove. This invention was the product of an entirely
empirical process; to use James' terminology, Franklin, "the lover
of facts," invented the wood stove. However, Franklin also had
rationalist, or religious, blood running through his veins. Thus,
Franklin reflects upon the possibility of approaching religion
empirically. Donald H. Meyer puts it this way:
14
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One could quickly see the advantages of his new wood stove,
Franklin had announced in 1744, by investigating the matter
for oneself, coming to understand the 'Properties' and the
'Principles' involved, examining them 'separately and
particularly,' then make the necessary 'comparisons.' Why
cannot something similar be done in the realm of faith ?5
This question proposes a marriage between science (empiricism,
experimentation, etc.) and faith or rationalism. Not unlike James,
Franklin seems to be negotiating between the extremes. Like James,
Franklin sees validity in both science and faith, empiricism and
rationalism. Thus, James and Franklin approach epistemology from
a very similar angle that enables them to remain receptive to the
divergent truth claims of empiricism and rationalism.
For James, such receptivity to these divergent truth claims clears
the philosophical road for pragmatism. By proceeding hand in
hand with both empiricism and rationalism, pragmatism is enabled
to avoid the pitfalls inherent in each. If monolithic, empiricism,
James realizes, will ask questions solely on matters of fact. On the
other hand, rationalism, if monolithic, will ask questions solely on
first principles and theoretical constructs. By blending these two
questions, 'pragmatic interrogations emerge. James writes:
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question.
'Grant an idea or belief to be true,' it says, 'what concrete
difference will its being true make in any one's actual life?
How will truth be realized? What experiences will be different
from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What,
in short, is the truth's case-value in experiential terms? 6
Unlike rationalism, pragmatism does not rule out many empirical
truth claims a priori. And unlike empiricism, pragmatism does not
rule out many rational truth claims a priori. Consequently, since
neither rationalism nor empiricism can become monolithic, the
fundamental criteria for philosophical legitimacy is a truth claim's
utility or consequential benefits. In a uniquely pragmatic move,
both rationalism and empiricism are allowed into the court of
arbitration if they, as Jacques Barzun writes, correspond to the
"fitness of further experiences" - that is, if they produce tangible,
harmonious experiential benefits. 7 Thus, in the pragmatic
paradigm, rationalism and empiricism are given assent if they
15
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produce positive quantifiable results. Any truth claim, whether
rationalistic or empirical, is deemed "true" if it is successful on this
score. As James writes: "The truth is the name of whatever proves
itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite,
assignable reasons." 8
The thread of continuity between Franklin and James becomes
more pronounced when we analyze how Franklin, mediating
between science and religion, evaluates truth claims based upon
James' "assignable reasons." Utilitarian value adjudicates between
the claims of science and religion when Franklin evaluates the
theology of his day. As with James, Franklin assigns a value to
pragmatism that supersedes the status of empirical or rational
"truth." Thus, also like James, Franklin gives the nod to measurable
consequences when evaluating religious concerns and their
implications. Writing of Franklin's theological beliefs, Donald H.
Meyer comments: "When the teachings of a sect go beyond the
'truths' we all 'know' they become matters of 'speculation,' and, as
such, are to be handled not on the basis of truth or falsity but of
social utility or worthlessness, perhaps mischief." 9 For Franklin,
then, the criteria of social utility (or worthlessness) hold primacy
over any speculative theological truth status (be it empirical or
rational).
James exemplifies this same evaluation of speculative theology.
Any estimation of a theological claim at the level of speculation
must be conducted in terms of utility. James seems to echo Franklin
when he writes: "The notion of God ... , however inferior it may be
in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical
philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that it
guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved." 10
Like Franklin, James favors any theological construct that
perpetuates social order. Consequently, Franklin implicitly and
James explicitly expound a new category of truth that transcends
the limitations of strict empiricism and rationalism while, at the
same time, not dismissing empiricism and rationalism from the
court of appeal. James evidences this new category of truth when
he writes: "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete
life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good
for so much." 11 Franklin aligns his beliefs within this same category
of truth when he contemplates the theological idea of the divinity
of Jesus Christ. Franklin writes that he will accept this belief "if that
Belief has the good Consequence, as probably it has, of making his
16
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Doctrines more respected and better observed ... " [emphasis
added]. 12 Alfred Owen Aldridge perhaps best illustrates the thread
of continuity linking Franklin and James when he describes
Franklin using James' terminology: "But on the surface Franklin
was a pragmatist, advocating beliefs and practices because of their
salutary effect upon society." 13
Closely related to Franklin and James' pragmatism is a
pronounced distrust of metaphysical abstraction. Such abstraction
tends toward empty rhetoric and casuistry, which bears little
relevance to the practical concerns of pragmatism. James, for
instance, insists that philosophy is not just abstraction, but, he
writes, a "positive connection in life." 14 A pragmatist, James asserts,
"turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed
systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." 15 James' discussion
of the one and the many illustrates this turning away. He writes:
'The world is One!'- the formula may become a sort of
number-worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been
reckoned sacred numbers, but, abstractly taken, why is 'one'
more excellent than 'forty-three,' or than 'two million and
ten'? In this first vague conviction of the world's unity, there
is so little to take hold of that we hardly know what we mean
by it.16
Full of sound and fury, "number-worship" and convictions of
the world's unity signify nothing. For James, these concepts are
nothing more than philosophical fodder for high-brow sophists.
More importantly, these concepts contribute little to the pragmatic
emphasis on measurable, positive, experiential and societal
consequences.
Franklin's aversion to abstraction follows along James' lines.
Franklin resists abstraction in order to concentrate on verifiable
results. In the Autobiography, Franklin discusses his intention of
writing an essay entitled "The Art of Virtue": "In this Piece it was
my Design to explain and enforce this Doctrine, that vicious
Actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden
because they are hurtful, the Nature of Man alone consider' d .... " 17
Here, Franklin implies his resistance to discussing ethics in terms of
abstract ontology. The belief that the forbiddenness of actions
precede their viciousness can only be the subject of abstract debate.
17
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What is concrete and knowable is the fact that vicious actions are
hurtful. Like James and his attitude toward "number-worship" and
the world's unity, Franklin sees no pragmatic merit in
philosophizing on the ontological status of ethics. Franklin asserts
that he is considering the "Nature of Man" alone; and such
considerations are not merely abstract, but concrete and
experientially quantifiable.
Concomitant to their distrust of abstraction, Franklin and James
censure dogmatism insofar as it thwarts pragmatism. A stubborn,
dogmatic position on any singular issue discourages the elasticity
that provides pragmatism with much of its efficacy. Pragmatism
rarely reposes confidence in an absolute, binding truth claim. For
this reason, James disapproves of dogmatic rationalism. He writes:
"To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which our intellects
may come to rest in a state of admiring contemplation is the great
rationalist failing." 18 In a similar manner, Franklin disapproves of
such finalities when he prescribes for himself the proper conduct
toward his fellow citizens. He states: "I made it a Rule to forbear all
direct Contradiction to the sentiments of others, and all positive
Assertion of my own. I even forbid myself agreeable to the old
Laws of our Junto, the Use of every Word or Expression in the
Language that imported afix'd Opinion ... " [emphasis added]. 19
Thus, we might better understand how Franklin's aversion to
dogmatic fixed opinions draws him to a particular Presbyterian
preacher described in the Autobiography. Franklin writes: " ... I
became one of his constant Hearers, his Sermons pleasing me as
they had little of the dogmatical kind, but inculcated strongly the
practice of virtue ... " [emphasis added]. 20 Perhaps Alfred Owen
Aldridge speaks for both Franklin and James when he asserts that
Franklin opposed "intellectual authoritarianism" and distrusted
"metaphysical dogmatism." 21 For James and Franklin, if the desired
end is utility and practical consequences, then the means must
adapt and self-correct itself to reach those ends. Dogmatism
presents an obstacle to this process.
If Franklin and James distrust such dogmatism, and if
dogmatism implies static truths, then it naturally follows that their
own philosophies will both espouse a quality of an opposite cast.
Thus, yet another thread of continuity links Franklin and James in
that both of their philosophies are characterized by their changing
character. As stated above, if the desired end is utility and practical
consequence, then the means must adapt and self-correct itself to
18
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reach those ends. It is clear that both Franklin and James are willing
to change their position on an issue and assign and reassign the
status of truth to these changing positions accordingly.
The changing character of James' philosophy becomes clear
when James articulates the nature of truth. Again, James is
searching for practical, beneficial consequences, and if a
proposition fulfills these conditions, such a proposition is deemed
true. James writes: "A new opinion counts as 'true' just in
proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the
novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock ... ."n In other words,
truth changes as new opinions harmonize with experience in a
continually ongoing process that seeks to actualize a positive
future. John Roth describes this Jamesian process as "continual
revision": "Our awareness of future expectations is not exhaustive,
is subject to error, and needs continual revision." 23 This revision,
this changeability, enables James to remain flexible as he steers
toward his elusive goal of practical consequences.
Since Franklin's Autobiography is, to a large extent, episodic,
perhaps a good way to illustrate the changing nature of Franklin's
philosophy is to recount an episode that exemplifies this
changeability. During his voyage to Philadelphia, Franklin resolves
to become a vegetarian. Franklin demonstrates that this decision
was not whimsical or arbitrary, but, instead, tended toward the
philosophical, when he adopts this tenet into a sect (complete with
doctrines and sermons) that he establishes with Samuel Keimer.24
Although Franklin's vegetarian convictions remain firm for a while,
the changing nature of his philosophy bears sway when he is
confronted with a plate of cod. This fish being his weakness,
Franklin rationalizes that since the cod eats smaller fish, he,
consequently, should have no objections to eating the cod. He
changes, or, in this case, makes an exception to, one tenet of his
philosophy. Throughout the Autobiography, Franklin's
philosophical as well as religious beliefs are subject to such
modifications. For this reason, Donald H. Meyer writes that, for
Franklin, "Institutions, including religious ones, were the
machinery that ran society. They were to be studied, used, repaired
when necessary, redesigned, even junked when the circumstances
demanded it." 25 Considered in the light of this sentence, the cod
incident perhaps serves as a microcosm of the changeable nature of
Franklin's philosophy as a whole. In fact, Franklin changed his
theological position so many times that many religious
19
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denominations of his day claimed him as their own. John Adams,
the second President of the United States, writes: "The Catholics
thought him almost a Catholic. The Church of England claimed
him as one of them. The Presbyterians thought him half a
Presbyterian, and the Friends believed him a wet Quaker." 26
Although the notion of change can often carry pejorative
connotations, forming images of instability or relativism in the
mind, Franklin and James concentrate their energies on the hopeful
possibilities of change. As a result of his many inventions, political
tracts and negotiations, military expeditions, and diplomacy
missions, Franklin transformed the course of America by
incorporating the concept of change into its vocabulary. Over 100
years before James, Franklin adapted a version of pragmatism that
became a modus operandi for American success. Kenneth Silverman
states that Franklin "incarnated the profoundly American belief
that things can be changed." 27 This profoundly American belief, of
course, informs James' pragmatism as well. John M. Russell
summarizes the fundamental role change plays as well as the
potential opportunities it provides when he writes, "Change, in a
word, best characterizes reality. Yet our efforts can hasten this
changing, unfinished world toward a more fulfilling destiny.
According to James, the meaning of our lives involves this very
possibility." 28
Change and its possibilities in creating a fulfilling destiny bring
us to the final thread of continuity linking Franklin and James that I
shall analyze. Since the consequences of the future are contingent
upon the changes made in the present, Franklin and James'
philosophies are future-oriented . That is, James and Franklin
consider the possibilities of change always with an eye to the
future. Future possibilities indelibly color their judgments. This is
why James writes that "pragmatism shifts the emphasis and looks
forward into facts themselves. The really vital question for us all is,
What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of
itself" [emphasis added]? 29 Jacques Barzun asserts that such
forward-looking questions naturally direct the mind to pragmatic
thinking. He writes: "When the natural purposiveness of the stream
of mind is directed rationally for making sure that an idea is right,
the search is 'pragmatic' in the sense that it looks chiefly to what

follows, not backwards to precedent or sideways to an 'original' "
[emphasis added]. 30 Franklin evidences this looking-at-whatfollows mentality perhaps most poignantly in his essay, "The
20

JOECKEL

11
1

I

n

Morals of Chess." He contends that the first lesson learned from
chess is foresight, which, as he writes, "looks a little into futurity
and considers the consequences that may attend an action ... ." 31
This lesson of foresight factors into nearly every facet of Franklin's
accomplishments. Indeed, Franklin's life could serve as the
metaphorical text for such a lesson. Thus, like the cod episode
described above, the lesson of foresight derived from chess playing
forms a sort of microcosm of Franklin as thinker - in this case, a
microcosm of Franklin's future-oriented approach to philosophy.
These, then, are just five of the threads of continuity that link
Franklin and James. We might also notice how these five threads
continually interweave. For example, Franklin and James'
mediation between science and religion (or empiricism and
rationalism) gives pragmatism its unique character; pragmatism, in
turn, in the thought of Franklin and James, depends upon such
mediation. Moreover, pragmatism naturally spawns a distrust of
abstraction and metaphysical dogmatism. The changing character
of Franklin and James' thought, consequently, is contingent upon
such distrust. And, to complete this interweaving process, this
changing variety of philosophy forces a future-oriented approach
to philosophy. All this goes to say that the interweaving of threads
serves to strengthen the intellectual ties that link Franklin and
James, namely because these interweaving threads are of such a
similar pattern. Thus, in terms of intellectual history, these threads
supply the evidence that suggests a continuity in American thought
spanning over a century.
As mentioned at the outset of this essay, however, this thread of
continuity, originating in the thought of Franklin, does not
terminate with the philosophy of James. If we follow its trajectory
beyond James, we can see that it reattaches itself to central tenets of
postmodernism. This is a remarkable phenomenon when we
consider the great epistemological divide that separates modernism
(a heading under which we must include both Franklin and James)
and postmodernism. I refer here to modernism not as a literary
phenomenon but as an epistemological phenomenon. Modernism,
as I am using the term is synonymous with Enlightenment
foundation, which finds its origin in Rene Descartes. Stretching
over such a g~ping divide, the thread of continuity is certainly in a
precarious position. On the postmodern side of the great
epistemological divide lies truth claims (or, perhaps better put, the
absence of truth claims) radically different from any modernist
21
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claim. Nancey Murphy addresses the enormous shift in thinking
which characterizes postmodernism when she writes: "I often point
out to students that they are privileged to live in an unusual and
exciting period in intellectual history. Changes as sweeping as
those now occurring in the intellectual world happen only rarelyperhaps the most recent such change was 300 years ago, although
we need more historical perspective to make sound judgments
here." 32 Before exploring how the thread of continuity connects
James and the "unusual and exciting" period of postmodernism, a
brief explanation of postmodern philosophy is in order. Such a
description must begin with postmodernism's favorite villain, Rene
Descartes.
In 1637, Rene Descartes ushered in the period known as the
Enlightenment with the publication of his Discourse on Method.
Employing mathematical methods and universal doubt, he sought
to break down knowledge and experience to indubitable
certainties. The rationalist/ foundationalist approach was highly
optimistic because it held that truth was "out there" and merely
needed to be "discovered." Descartes wrote:" ... there is only one
truth to each thing, whoever finds it knows as much about the
thing as there is to be known .... " 33 The one truth that Descartes
claimed he knew for certain is expressed in the celebrated phrase,
"cogito ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am." 34 The searcl1 for truth,
Descartes maintained, could be built upon this certain and
unshakable foundation; the search was furthermore undergirded
by the belief that truth was stable and knowable.
Late twentieth-century thinkers turned the Enlightenment on its
head when they questioned the very starting point of Descartes'
methodology. Descartes claimed to assume nothing when he began
his inquiry. Careful to avoid any a priori deductions, inductions, or
assumptions, Descartes attempted to divest himself of all
interpreted data to reach an unquestionable epistemological
foundation . But as William Placher writes, uninterpreted data are
never truly uninterpreted; inquiries are never conducted without
assumptions; and foundationalism is never truly foundational:
"Only in the context of assuming some things can he question other
things . . . We cannot build knowledge on a foundation of
uninterpreted sense-data, because we cannot know particular
sense-data in isolation from the conceptual schemes we use to
organize them" [emphasis in original]. 35 Those "conceptual
schemes" may include the language with which knowledge is
22
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made communicable, the society or culture of which the inquirer is
a member, or the historical time period in which the inquirer lives. 36
Epistemological starting points, in other words, cannot be objective.
All observations, as Placher writes, are "theory-laden." 37 The result,
then, of postmodern/post-Enlightenment thinking is the belief that
there exists no universal standard by which we may judge
rationality and truth-no Archimedean point of reference. Any
understanding of the world is necessarily a contextualized
understanding.
The move from the deconstruction of rationalism to the
deconstruction of empiricism and the scientific method was
inevitable. Just as the postmodern rejects Cartesian rationalism on
the basis of its claim to objective starting points of inquiry, so the
postmodern rejects John Locke's empiricism for similar reasons.
The postmodern denial of universal standards of criteria
undermines the empiricist's search for definite fact via immediate
sense-experience. Likewise, the long-cherished objective nature of
science and the scientific method, the postmodern claims, is a
misnomer. The findings of science do not represent a linear
progression toward truth or the way things "really are"; rather,
they answer the questions, framed by assumptions, asked by
particular scientists of a particular time. Stanley Grenz writes that
Einstein's general theory of relativity, Werner Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle, and Louis de Broglie's Quantam theory all
contribute to undermine the certitude reposed in the
Enlightenment project and its appeal to the scientific method. He
writes "According to the new understanding, scientific knowledge
is not a compilation of objective universal truths but a collection of
research traditions borne by particular communities of inquirers." 38
Thus, scientific truth claims cannot be divorced from the scientist
who made them, empirical truth claims cannot be divorced from
the empiricist who made them, and rational truth claims cannot be
divorced from the rationalist who made them. In addition, to claim
that anything is scientifically, empirically, or rationally true is an
Enlightenment/modem move that the postmodern would reject
categorically. As Stephen T. Davis writes, in postmodernism,
"There is no such thing as objectivity; everybody approaches reality
with certain commitments and interests." 39 Truth claims, as
mentioned previously, are simply answers to questions framed by
assumptions. Perhaps we can summarize the postmodern position
in the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer: "I believe one can say in
23
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principle: There can be no proposition that is purely and simply
true." 40
As stated at the outset of this essay, James' philosophy merges
with postmodernism on three fundamental issues. First, concurring
with the most basic assumption of postmodernism, James exhibits a
skepticism concerning purely objective truth- truth of a Cartesian
flavor. This skepticism derives from a distinctly postmodern
understanding of the contextual nature of knowledge described
above. James implicitly rejects Descartes by suggesting that there
exists no privileged, objective point of reference (to use my
previous phrase, no Archimedean point of reference) from which to
judge philosophical claims. Like the postmodernist, then, James
hints at the inevitability of contextualized understandings of the
world. At the beginning of Pragmatism, for example, James
indicates that a philosopher's temperament necessarily influences
and colors his or her judgment. James, therefore, casts off any
pretension to neutrality. He writes:
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.. . of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is,
he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his
temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized
reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his
conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger
bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. 41
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Thus, the far-reaching influence of temperament precludes the
possibility of objective premises and, consequently, objective
conclusions as well. This all goes to say, then, that the concept of
objective truth itself is questionable. James corroborates this in so
many words when he writes: "The whole notion of truth, which
naturally and without reflection we assume to mean the simple
duplication by the mind of a ready-made and given reality, proves
hard to understand clearly." 42 This sentence could very well be
inserted into any primer on postmodernism; it delineates
postmodernism's primary tenet. In fact, John Roth's explanation of
James' concept of truth could very well pass for a descriptive
comment on postmodernism. He writes: "Truth is not something
absolute and fixed-to think so is moving to the level of
unwarranted abstraction." 43
Closely related to James' pessimism of objective trl{th is his
uncanny, even eerie, anticipation of that dimension of:
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postmodernism known as perspectivalism. This, then, is yet
another thread that connects James to postmodernism. Harold Heie
defines perspectivalism as "the view that our claims to knowledge
unavoidably reflect our particular perspectives as members of
different interpretative communities." 44 Thus, not only can the
temperament of a philosopher affect his or her judgments, but so
can the perspective from which he or she judges as well. James
provides perhaps his most explicit assent to perspectivalism (even
though it had not yet at the time been developed into a specifically
philosophical construct) when he writes: "What we say about
reality thus depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The
that of it is its own, but the what depends on the which; and the
which depends on us" [italics in original]. 45 James provides an
example of this phenomenon by pointing to mathematics. He
asserts: "You can take the number 27 as the cube of 3, or as the
product of 3 and 9, or as 29 plus 1, or 100 minus 73, or in countless
other ways, of which one will be just as true as another" [emphasis
in original]. 46 What is true, then, depends upon perspective.
Philosophical judgments hinge upon perspective. James develops
this idea in Pragmatism; postmodernists laud it as the first step in
doing successful philosophy.
For James and postmodernists, however, perspectivalism
indicates that something more than clever mathematical concepts is
at stake. One might extrapolate from James' mathematical example
to the much more radical claim that all of intellectual history is
contingent upon perspective. Again, contrary to Descartes, one
perspective need not be more true than any other perspective, just
as 9 times 3 is not any more true than 31 minus 4. Instead, one
perspective may be more useful given the intellectual, scientific, or
societal context of a given community. 47 James employs this
postmodern concept of perspective when he discusses scientific
advancement. He writes:
The Laws [of science] themselves, moreover, have grown so
numerous that there is no counting them, and so many rival
formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that
investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no
theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of
them may from some point of view be useful. 48
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In this regard, James seems to anticipate Thomas Kuhn, who in
turn greatly influenced many postmodernists. Kuhn calls the
changing of "transcripts of reality" that have transpired over the
centuries "paradigm shifts." No paradigm is inherently superior to
another; rather, each paradigm affords a more useful point of view
for that community. Changing scientific theories, Kuhn contends,
represent" .. . neither a decline nor a raising of standards, but
simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new paradigm." 49
Thus, we can see how James explores a concept of perspectivalism
that would later become the primary lens through which Kuhn and
postmodernists visualize intellectual history.
A third commonality linking James and postmodernism
emerges naturally from perspectivalism and represents what
postmodernists believe to be the hopeful possibility of
postmodernism in action: genuine conversation. As a consequence
of modern/Enlightenment thought, certain interpretative
communities were excluded from the philosophical court of
arbitration due to their supposed empirical or rational inferiority.
Such communities were simply left out of the conversation. As a
result of perspectivalism, however, no community can be excluded.
Again, no perspective is superior (at least on broadly empirical or
rational grounds) to another; the categories of epistemological
legitimacy have shifted dramatically. In postmodernism, then, and
as a result of perspectivalism, conversation is paramount. Wendy
MacCredie states: "[Perspectivalism] is a view that recognizes
difference and affirms it. Just because we have different views does
not mean we cannot talk to each other" [emphasis added]. 50 Thus,
postmodernism emphasizes an open line of conversation.
The importance of open conversation and free inquiry governs
much of Pragmatism. Since (as I stated earlier) the possibility of
conversation emerges naturally from perspectivalism, and since
James adopts a strong form of perspectivalism, we can easily
deduce the importance of conversation in James' philosophy. In
line with the essence of postmodern conversation, James does not
rule out any proposition a priori. Every proposition, in other words,
deserves a hearing. James writes: "On pragmatic principles, we
cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow
from it." 51 Similarly, John Roth states that, in pragmatism,
" ... attempts to determine meaning need to be free, open,
descriptive, and nonreductive." 52 Thus, it is evident that the
method of pragmatism and the method of postmodernism merge
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to form yet a third thread of continuity between James and the
postmodernists.
Since these threads of continuity connect James and
postmodernism, and since numerous other threads link James and
Franklin, we can now address ourselves to the startling, though
logical conclusion that a continuity of thought spans from Franklin,
across approximately two centuries of intellectual history, straight
into postmodernism. We must qualify this conclusion, however, by
adding that the connection between Franklin and postmodernism is
tentative, perhaps even sketchy and tenuous at times. But a thread
of continuity between the two is clearly visible if we analyze the
thought of Franklin as containing the seeds of postmodernism or, to mix metaphors, if we recognize that the birth pangs of
postmodernism exist in embryonic form in Franklin's philosophy.
Analyzing in this light, we can detect, in hints and guesses, how
some of Franklin's thoughts anticipate the intellectual revolution
two centuries later.
Although often considered the quintessential man of the
Enlightenment, Franklin often evidences a pessimism of the potential
of knowledge and positivistic thinking. As we have already noted,
Franklin resists positive affirmations and propositions asserted in a
positive tone. According to Franklin, no one owns a monopoly on
truth because truth is often slippery. To affirm a proposition
positively with blithe self-assurance is to belie this fact. In this regard,
then, Franklin borders on the postmodem attitude toward truth.
Specifically, Franklin, like the postmodernists, seems to deflate
Cartesian optimism in a universal and knowable truth. In a 1759letter
to Mary Stevenson, Franklin writes:
And indeed all our Knowledge is so imperfect, and we are
from a thousand Causes so perpetually subject to Mistake and
Error, that Positiveness can scarce ever become even the most
knowing; and Modesty in advancing any Opinion, however,
plain and true we may suppose it, is always decent, and
generally more likely to procure Assent. 53

is,

These thoughts reflect the temper of postmodernism-a modesty
engendered by the awareness of the limitations of knowledge.
We can see, then, how Franklin's awareness of these limitations
helped pave the way for the postmodem conclusion that purely
objective truth does not exist. The postmodern denial of objective
27
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truth naturally proceeds from the Franklinian awareness of
the limitations of knowledge. If we plotted the course of
postmodernism, in other words, Franklin's thoughts could very
well represent the launching point. Causality in intellectual history
again enters the picture. Thoughts such as Franklin's were among
the sufficient causes to propose the radical questions that molded
postmodernism into what it is today. In this sense, then, a thread of
continuity links Franklin and postmodernism.
If, as I have suggested, threads of continuity in intellectual
history interweave with other threads, then we might expect
Franklin to share other commonalities with postmodernists. This
expectation is fulfilled when we notice that Franklin adopts a form
of perspectivalism in his philosophy and theology. Here, as with
James, threads interweave in the sense that perspectivalism is
closely related, in fact, is almost a corollary, to a skepticism of
objective truth. Franklin exhibits a perspectivalism similar in form
to that of James and the postmodernists when he analyzes the
various truth claims of the theological denominations of his day.
He first considers the theology of a sect known as the "Dunkers"
and then elucidates an analogy incorporating the image of fog. He
writes:
This Modesty in a Sect [the Dunkers] is perhaps a singular
Instance in the History of Mankind, every other Sect
supposing itself in Possession of all Truth, and that those who
differ are so far in the Wrong: Like a Man travelling in foggy
Weather: Those at some Distance before him on the Road he
sees wrapped up in the Fog, as well as those behind him, and
also the People in the Fields on each side, but near him all
appears clear. Tho' in truth he is as much in the Fog as any of
them. 54
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In this analogy, every man, as a result of the fog, can see within
a circumscribed space. Such space that man attributes as truth.
However, the "truthness" of that parameter of vision only results
from that man's perspective. Moreover, visualizing the image
holistically, we can see tha~ every man is clouded in fog. Since
the fog restricts the scope of vision, and since the fog is
all-encompassing, all judgments depend upon perspective. In
this respect, then, we can see how Franklin's illustration of the
nature of theological truth is distinctly postrnodern.
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Not surprisingly, Franklin's thought consequently develops
the same pattern found in postmodernism. The nature of
perspectivalism readily lends itself to the type of open conversation
discussed earlier. Thus, perspectivalism and conversation
interweave in both Franklinian and postmodern thought. Franklin
appeals to open conversation and free inquiries when he sketches
an outline of his Sect of the Free and Easy. He searches for
commonalities among American citizens that would be conducive
to promoting harmony and benevolence in an open society. After
enumerating the basic tenets of all religions, he writes:
. .. these I esteem' d the Essentials of every Religion, and being
to be found in all Religions we had in our Country I respected
them all, tho' with different degrees of Respect as I found
them more or less mix' d with other Articles which without
any Tendency to inspire, promote or confirm Morality, serv' d
principally to divide us & make us unfriendly to one
another. 55
Perhaps implicitly recognizing the nature of perspectivalism,
Franklin attempts to reach beyond the metaphorical fog and unite
American citizens in the spirit of friendliness. 56 Franklin's method
of achieving this goal is founded upon the hope shared by many
postmodernists: a genuine conversation founded not upon rigidity
and exclusion, but open-mindedness and receptivity. For this
reason, Alfred Owen Aldridge writes that" . . . tolerance and
humanitarianism were the only continuously and unchanging
dogmas in [Franklin's] creed." 57 These same qualities govern
postmodern conversation today.
It is possible, therefore, to detect elements of postmodernism in
the philosophy of Franklin. Or, perhaps better put, it is possible to
detect elements of Franklin's philosophy in postmodernism. Either
way, the threads of continuity illustrate the continuous nature of
intellectual history. As we have seen, in many ways, the ideas of
Franklin fit congruously with the ideas of James, which, in turn, fit
congruously with postmodern ideas. Moreover, the commonalities
linking Franklin, James, and postmodernists form a vast fabric of
interweaving threads, which crisscross between each thinker in
elaborate, sometimes surprising ways. And as these threads
interweave, ideas span centuries, and American intellectual history
is made.
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